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CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY

OF

OBLIGATION.

HUDSON

V.

BROWNING.'-

Each of the promises in a bilateral contract must impose on the
respective promissor some definite legal obligation.2
This Is usually
expressed by saying that there must be "mutuality of obligation". The
expression is apt, but it is sometimes mistaken as a requirement of
equality between the obligations or of adequacy of each promise as
consideration for the other.
A legal obligation must be sufficiently
definite to admit of being measured. An exact measure, expressed in
so many pounds, or cords, or days of labor, i not necessary, but the
undertaking must be so expressed that the words when taken together
with admissible evidence of the circumstances surrounding the transaction fix a standard of admeasurement by which the obligation will
ultimately be rendered certain in extent.'
Hudson v. Browning,' recently decided by the Supreme Court, illustrates the difficulty in determining whether a promise Is sufficiently
1. (1915) 174 . W. 393.
2. 1 Parsons, Contracts (9th ed.) p. 486, note; 1 Page, Contracts, p.
3. Forbes v. St. Louis, I. M. d S. R. R. Go. (1904) 107 Mo. App. 661,
82 S. W. 562.
4. Wells V. Alexander (1891) 130 N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142. See 11 L.
R. A. (N. S.) p. 713.
452.

(38)
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definite to impose a legal obligation on the promissor so as to be a
good consideration for a promise. In a written agreement executed
on February 25, 1910, the plaintiffs agreed to make, purchase and deliver to the defendant and the defendant agreed to accept and pay
for, all the ties of certain grades that the plaintiffs "may be able to
purchase or make up, to 200,000 ties, commencing on this date and
ending June 1, 1911". The plaintiffs "do not bind themselves to make
or purchase and deliver the full 200,000 ties, but they do bind themselves to use every effort at their command to secure as many of the
200,000 ties as their time, money and efforts will permit them, and so
long as they do this said second party will not permit any other person
or firm to purchase ties for them in the territory . . .... The defendant agreed "to purchase and receive from said first parties the
full 200,000 ties enumerated above, or any portion thereof, within the
time-limit stated above, if said first parties with their best efforts are
able to secure that many". The court held that there was no mutuality
of obligation because the "plaintiffs by their contract do not agree to
furnish the full 200,000 ties or any definite portion thereof ....
Nothing is said in what territory their efforts shall be used. The
amount of time to be used is uncertain and indefinite, as is also the
money to be used".
The Supreme Court relied upon the decision of the St. Louis Court
of Appeals in Campbell v. American Handle Co.,' where the plaintiff
"was to cut and deliver at the defendant's factory" all the ash timber
of certain lengths which he "could cut and haul off" a described
tract of land between specified dates; which agreement was held to be
unenforceable.. In Hazelhurst Lumber Co. v. Mercantile Lumber S
Supply Co.,0 recently decided by the United States Circuit Court for
the western district of Missouri, the defendant agreed to purchase,
receive, and pay for all the ties that plaintiff could produce and ship
to defendant until January 1, 1908. No limits were placed on the
plaintiff, no territory was specified, no maximum or minimum amounts
were named, and the court very briefly dismissed the case by saying
7
that "the contract is manifestly void for want of mutuality".
In a more recent case in the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Rozier v.
8
St. Louis S S. F. R. R. Co., the defendant was to purchase at a fixed
5.

(1906)

117 Mo. App. 19, 94 S. W. 815.

6. (1908) 166 Fed. 191.
7. But compare the dictum of Ray, J., in Sheppy v. Stevens (1910) 177
Fed. 484, 486: "If the conduct and associations of A are such that they tend
to bring disgrace on B, a relative of A, and B agrees with C that C shall
do all he can and use his best efforts to break up such associations and
cause such conduct to cease, and that he will in consideration of such efforts
and expenditure of time and thought, pay C the sum of $5000, and there
s a .time limit for performance, and C fully performs on his part, can there
be any doubt but that C may recover the c(onsideration agreed to be paid? I think

not. It is not necessary that the promissor in such a caise receive an actual
benefit by way of the success of the efforts of C. It is all-sufficient that hc
had the benefit of the efforts of C In a matter which interested him, B."
S. (1910) 147 Mo. App. 290, 126 S. W. 532.
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price per yard all the rock and dirt which the plaintiff could get out
of a quarry during a specified time. The court held that it was a
valid agreement not lacking in mutuality and that it was sufficiently
certain altho a minimum amount was not stipulated. In Campbell v.
American Handle Co. the maximum amount was all the timber the
plaintiff could cut from a described tract of land. In Rozier v. St.
Louis & S. F. R. R. Co., it was all the stone the quarry-man could get
out of a certain quarry. In this respect, therefore, no distinction can
be drawn between the two cases even tho it is stated in the latter case
that the parties.were acquainted with the output of the quarry, because
that circumstance only serves to make Rozier v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R.
Co. as certain as Campbell v. American Handle Co., in that timber on
the surface can be more accurately computed than strata of rock hidden
in the earth, which strata are likely to be unexpectedly exhausted at
any time. In Hudson v. Browning, however, we find no such difficulty.
The maximum is stated in definite numbers. As to the minimum
amounts, Campbell v. American Handle Co. and Rozier v. St. Louis &
S. F. R. R. Co. are again similar, unless the different types of business furnish a basis for distinction. Perhaps quarrying is a more
standardized business than tie-cutting. And yet, even a tie-cutter, who
ordinarily employs as many men and teams as a particular job calls
for, has a minimum force and that minimum will do some work and
therefore a promise to use his best efforts would be a promise of
something of value, which promise is consideration for a promise. The
court in Rozier v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. offers to distinguish
Campbell v. American Handle Co. as a case in which "there was no
agreement to sell the whole yield of the factory, but simply to sell and
deliver to the defendant timber of certain lengths without in any way
designating the quantity". But it is not perceived that an agreement
to sell the whole output of a factory is any more definite than an
agreement to sell all the timber of a certain description which one
can by using reasonable efforts cut and haul off of a certain tract of
land within a certain time. It is submitted therefore that in effect
Rozier v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. overrules Campbell v. American
Handle Co.
In Hudson v. Browning, no question was raised as to the sufficiency
of the defendant's promise. The plaintiffs promised to use "every
effort at their c6mmand to secure as many of the 200,000 ties as
their time, money and efforts would permit." The court considered
this too indefinite and compared it with a promise to buy as much as
the promissor "may desire",9 or "might want or desire in his business",0 or "might want in the general foundry business during a cer9. American Cotton Co. v. Kirk, (1895) 68 Fed. 791.
10. Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. K. C. B. & N. Co. (1902), 114 Fed. 77.
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tain period", 1 all of which promises are void for want of certainty
and mutuality, the one party not binding himself to want or desire
1
any amount. But a promise to buy "its requirements of coal", " or
steel casting," or a promise to sell "all the blankets of his manufacture",' 4 is definite and substantial, because the amount to be furnished
will ultimately be rendered certain by the means of admeasurement
agreed upon. Similarly, it would seem that the amount which time,
money and efforts will make and purchase will be rendered certain
by a measure just 'as accurate. And as the requirement of a business or its output is not determined by the caprice of Its owner, so
the amount of money on hand, as well as time and efforts, is none
the more subject to the whim of its master-money plus time and
efforts being as calculable as machinery plus time and efforts. The
fact that the defendants promised not to permit "any other person or
firm to purchase ties for them in the territory along or adjacent to
the North Missouri Central Railway's line of road, for which the
above ties are to be used for construction of said road," shows that
the defendant was probably acquainted with the character and magnitude of the plaintiffs' business and thought it such a well established
one as to justify him in entrusting to it the gathering of the ties
needed in the construction of the road. But even if the defendant
was not sure that the plaintiffs' time, money and efforts would deliver
any ties, 15 yet the plaintiffs' promise necessarily connotes that they
would not make or purchase ties for any one else between February
25, 1910 and June 1, 1911.16 This limits their freedom of action for
the future in that they cannot sell to anyone else during that time.
Whether they did use their best efforts does not affect the validity of
the contract; it is only material in determining whether the plaintiffs
have broken their promise, and in the principal case the defendant does
not rely upon any alleged breach.
That the conclusion from these observations is not without authority is shown in the Minnesota case of Emerson v. Pacific, etc. Packing
Co." The defendant appointed the plaintiffs its exclusive agents for
713.

.11,

Tarbox v. Gotzein (1873)

20 Minn. 139. See

11 L. R. A.

(N. s.) p.

12. Minn. Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co. (1896) 160 1l1. 85.
13. Lima Locomotive, etc. Co. v. National Steel Castings Co. (1907) 155
Fed. 77.
14. lladden v. Dimick (1866) 31 I-ow. Prac. (N. Y.) 196, reversed in

(1872) 48 N. Y. 661, on the ground that there was some evidence tending to
show a parol waiver of the contract by the plaintiff which should have been
left to the jury.

15. MTARSHALL, J.. In McCall v. Icdes (Wis., 1900) 83 N. W. 300, 302, says:
'Mere indefiniteness as to the amount of material or goods which may be
delivered under a contract or uncertainty even as to whether any will be
delivered, is not necessarily a fatal uncertainty."
16. Willi-ton's Wald's Pollock, Contracts (3d ed.) p. 196, 197.
17. (1905) 96 Minn. 1, 104 N. W. 573. Cited with approval in Martin Water
& Power Co. v. Town of Sausalito (Cal.. 1914) 143 Pac. 767, where MELVIN, J.,
In a dictim says: "Generally a contract by which one party agrees to use
his 'best endeavors' to promote the sale of a commodity produced by the other
party, ...
is valid and not wanting In mutuality." A dictum in Spencer
v. Taylor (1904) 69 Kan. 493, 77 Pac. 276, is in accord.
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a definite term to sell on commission eighty-five per cent of its pack
of fish. The plaintiffs obligated themselves to use their "best efforts"
to sell such pack. The court held without much argument that the
promise was sufficiently definite, saying: "The plaintiffs accepted the
contract and obligated themselves during the whole period named to
use their best efforts to sell defendant's merchandise and actually performed services in introducing and defraying expenses thereunder.
The promises, therefore, were not all on one side, there was mutuality
of obligation." Damages awarded were such profits, past and future,
as proximately resulted from the breach.
8
In Taylor Co. v. Bannerman," the plaintiff had agreed to act as
agent of the defendant who agreed that the plaintiff should be his
exclusive agent. The court held that the plaintiff's undertaking was
good consideration altho the duties of the plaintiff were not definitely
set out, for the plaintiff was bound to exercise "due diligence".
In Mitchell Taylor Tie Co. v. Whitaker" the plaintiff agreed to
deliver .all the merchantable ties that he could make from his own
lands, or purchase or acquire from others for one year, and the court
held that the contract was mutually binding, the plaintiff being bound
to exercise reasonable diligence. A very recent decision by the Court °
of Appeals of Kentucky, Ayer C Lord Tie Co. v. 0. T. O'Bannon & Co.,2
followed Mitchell Taylor Co. v. Whitakcer and seems to settle the law
in Kentucky. The defendant was to buy, inspect, receive and pay for
all the ties that plaintiff "could or would" deliver before January 1,
1914. The court ruled that the words "or would" were inadvertently
used, the contract being oral, and it held that with those words eliminated the contract was "not lacking in mutuality" and imposed upon
the plaintiff the duty of exercising reasonable diligence to procure
and deliver to the defendants all the ties that he could. Certainly
the Kentucky court could not have required that a party in order to
exercise "reasonable diligence" should do more than use "every means
at their command to secure as many of the 200,000 ties as their time,
money and efforts will permit", and yet the Missouri Supreme Court
says this is not sufficiently definite.
A promise to do as much as one's time, money and efforts will
permit is a promise to do as much as one is able. In such a promise
the amount of performance is not fixed. On the other hand, in a
promise to pay or to do something when able the time of performance is not set. The latter promise however, is held definite and substantial enough to impose an obligation to pay or do at the moment
the promisor becomes able.'" It would seem, therefore, that the former
1.8.

(1904)

120 Wis. 189, 97 N. AV. 918. Cf. Pcck-lWilliamson If. & V. Co.
118 S. W. 376; i'ederal Iron & Brass Bed Go. v.

v. Miller & Harris (Ky., 1909)

Hock (1906) 42 Wash. 668. 85 Pac. 418.
.19.
20.
21.

(1914) 158 Ky. 651, 166 S. W. 193.
(Ky., 1915) 174 S. W. 783.
Williston's Wald's 'ollock. Contracts (3d ed.)

p. 152.
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should impose a similar obligation, and that the plaintiff's promise in
the principal case should impose an obligation to perform as far as
able. This would lead to the conclusion that the contract in Hudson
V. Browning had sufficient mutuality to be enforceable.
J. P. H.
CONTRACTS-OFFER BACKED up By DEPOSIT.

Sooy v. WlrErR.1'-When

an offer is supplemented merely by a gratuitous promise to keep the
offer open for a fixed or for a reasonable time, it is elementary in the
common law that the offer is just as revocable as if no such promise
had been given. Where, on the other hand, an offer is supplemented
by a contract to keep it open, that is, a promise supported by a consideration, or a promise under seal where seals retain their common
law force, the offer cannot rightfully be withdrawn before the expiration of the time contracted for. In such case an offeree may ignore
an intervening "revocation", accept the offer in spite of it and 2 have
all the rights that he would have had in case none had intervened.
Whether any given thing done or promise made by the offeree
as consideration for the promise of time is in law such, is determined
by the ordinary rules. The general rule of course is that any act
done or promise made by the promisee, provided it is the act or promise definitely called for either expressly or impliedly by the promissor
as an exchange for his promise, is a sufficient consideration; subject
not only to the proviso that an act or promise of an act which one
is already legally bound to do is no consideration, but also to the
rather vague proviso that tho the act or promise may be of the most
trifling value yet it must be of some value in the eyes of the law.
It seems that the mere promise of an offeree to take the offer
under advisement, that is, to consider it, fails of recognition as a
sufficient consideration, by reason of the last proviso, for usually all
that is meant by the parties to such an understanding is that the
offeree promises to think it over. So impalpable a promise, resting
as its performance would upon the mere say-so of the maker, may well
be regarded by the law as of no value whatever.3
But suppose the promise to consider the offer means to both
parties something more than thinking about it? Suppose land is
offered for sale and the offerer proposes to keep the offer open ten days
if the offeree will agree to go and look at the land, investigate the
title and consider the offer? Clearly such a promise is sufficient con1.

(1915) 175 S. W. 132.

2. See the discussion of these rules and of cases in which they may be
modified by other principles, in 27 Harvard Law Review 644.
3. See Boston & Maine R. R. v. Bartlett (1849) 3 Cushing (Mass.) 224.
Cases directly in point seem to be wanting, but if the law were otherwise than as
stated In the text it is remarkable that in none of the numerous cases in which
the existence of a consideration for an option has been in question, has the
court found it in the easily implied undertaking of the offeree to "consider
the offer."
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sideration. So it has been said that a promise by the offeree to take
the property off the market and consider no other offers is sufficient.'
Assume, on the other hand, that the offerer while promising to keep
the offer open does not request the offeree to view the land or look up
the title as an exchange for this promise, yet the offeree does these
things; here again the offer is revocable at any time before a promise
to buy is made-' The apparent dictum in Sooy v. Winter that an offer
cannot be withdrawn after the offeree has changed his position to his
detriment in consequence of the offer 6 is not accepted law.
This loss or detriment by change of position in consequence of
the offer or in reliance upon a gratuitously promised time for deliberation seems in many cases a hardship on an offeree.. Not having contracted for this time for deliberation, perhaps the offeree has only
himself to blame; but it is argued, why should he not be recompensed,
or merely reimbursed, for such expenditure as he has made in reasonable reliance upon the offerer's morally binding undertaking? It
is admitted that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply; the promise
regarded as a representation, is no more than a representation of
intention.'
The great German jurist von Ihering advanced the view that
the law ought to allow an action to recover damages for culpa in contrahendo, which for present purposes may be translated as recovery
for damages or expenses suffered or undergone in mis-reliance upon
the assumption that the promise was binding. It would differ from
the usual quasi-contractual action to recover a benefit, an unjust enrichment, conferred upon the defendant, since it seeks to recompense
the plaintiff for a detriment to him, tho no benefit accrued to the defendant. Recovery would be limited to reimbursement for actual detriment as distinguished from a contract action to recover for loss
of prospective profits.
French jurists have also seen justice in this concept, but it is
nowhere contended that the civil law has incorporated the principle
Into positive law, and certainly the common law has not. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana recently decided a case in accordance with this
principle, but upon rehearing evidently concluded that it had only
the sanction of morality and not of law.8 The principle may be made
operative by contract between the offerer and offeree. Thus an offerer
unwilling to contract that his offer shall be irrevocable may for a
consideration promise to reimburse, if he should revoke the offer, the
4.
5.
6.

Wearer v. Burr (1888) 31 IV. Va. 736, 8 S. E. 743.
Comstock Bros. v. North (1906) 88 Miss. 754, 41 So. 374.

See Harriman, Contracts, § 259. Groomis v. McCully, (1902) 93 Mo.
App. 544, does net involve this fallacy. It was merely an offer contemplating

acts as the acceptance and the offer was withdrawn before the acts were done,
or even begun.
7. Ewart, Estoppel, p. 68 et seq.; Bigelow,

Estoppel, p. 631 et seq.;

Harriman, Contracts, § 649, and ef §§ 129, 150.
8. Kaplan v. Whitworth (1906) 116 La. 337, 50 So. 723.
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offeree for any expense incurred in considering it. And the amount
of damages thus payable may be liquidated by agreement.9
0
In Sooy v. Winter,"
the Kansas City Court of Appeals thought
that there was some evidence that such an agreement had been made,
and in this aspect of the case it rightly said that such a promise of
liquidated damages must be supported by a consideration to render it
enforcible. The fact that the offeree was a foreign corporation whose
home office was at a great distance from the place in which the offer
was submitted to a local agent, and that the time was given to enable
the agent to transmit the offer to the company, and the company to
consider it, did not incline the court to hold that even under these
circumstances a promise to consider the offer was of value in the eyes
of the law. Supposing the agent authorized to make the promise, this
promise of the corporation to consider the offer, would seem no more
than equivalent to the promise of a natural person as offeree to give
It thought. The fact that a corporation's mental machinery is more
cumbersome should not alone be a ground for giving it a better position
as an offeree than has a natural person. The agent had no authority
to sell at the price offered but, upon the offerer's depositing with him
two checks for $500 each, he agreed to transmit the offer to the company for its consideration.
The corporation accepted the offer but
before it had done so the offerer had given notice of a revocation, and
now sued to recover $500, one of the checks having been cashed. The
plaintiff recovered judgment in the circuit court and defendant appealed. From respondent's brief, it seems that the plaintiff's theory
below simply was that the offer was revocable and being timely revoked the offerer should have his deposit back. The defendant seems
to have taken issue solely on the revocability of the offer. Of course,
the deposit made by the offerer himself could not be a consideration
for his own promise, and, as seen above, the offeree neither did nor
ptomised anything of value. But this issue did not dispose of the
case as the court said in remanding it.
Even on the assumption that a promise to pay liquidated damages
might be inferred from the evidence (the agreement was oral), payable if the offerer withdrew the offer, and the court had found a consideration given for this promise, still the offer was revocable, because
such an agreement Is inconsistent with an absolute promise not to revoke; it seems that such an agreement should be construed as only a
contract to recompense for culpa in contrahendo.
The evidence is not clear what understanding was had with reference to the deposit of the checks. Sometimes such deposits are made
merely as an assurance of the seriousness of the offerer and as some
9. It Is not suggested here that such an agreement should necessarily be
inferred from evidence merely showing that a deposit was made to back up
the offer.
10. (1915) 175 S. W. 132.
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evidence of his ability to perform if his offer is accepted, and there
is an understanding that the sum so deposited shall go as partial payment in case the offer is accepted, and returned if the negotiation
falls thru for any reason. Nothing being shid about forfeiture in
case of revocation of the offer, this derogation from the normal rule
could scarcely be implied from the agreement just stated. On the
other hand, if there is evidence that the deposit was also made with
reference to the dilemma in which the offeree might be placed by a
revocation, an agreement ought to be inferred that the deposit was to
be forfeited upon a revocation. If also it appears that the offeree
was authorized to cash the checks at once, it seems that the case
would be that of a payment which in case of acceptance was to be
applied upon the purchase price, and in case of refusal to complete
payment after acceptance or in case of revocation was to be retained
by the offeree. No ground for the recovery of a payment under such
circumstances is conceived. There is no mistake, duress, fraud, failure
of consideration or other recognized ground of recovery.
Suppose instead of an advance payment there is a promise without
consideration to pay a sum of money as liquidated damages for the
detriment caused the offeree by a revocation of the offer, and the
promised damages were voluntarily paid after the offer was revoked,
While, contrary to the
could the offerer recover such payment?
intimation of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, the general rule Is
that a payment made on the erroneous assumption that one is under
legal obligation to make it, unless it is a pure mistake of law, may
be recovered, yet there is a well established. exception that no recovery
may be had where the defendant may in equity and good conscience
"Equity" in this rule is not used technically but in the
keep it."
loose senie of layman's justice. It is sufficient that the payee has a
moral right to retain, and the essential justice of the theory of compensation for culpa in contrahendo demonstrates the existence of a
well-recognized moral right in this case. The consideration necessary
to render a promise enforcible is quite a different matter from the
equities which entitle a payee to retain a payment. It Is only promises,
not payments, that need consideration.
Consequently, if the checks were deposited with an authority In
the offeree to cash them upon a revocation, no recovery could be had
whether upon the theory of payment or upon the theory of voluntary
performance of a gratuitous promise to pay. The latter is true even
if the offerer permitted the cashing under the erroneous belief that
his deposit rendered binding his own promise not to revoke. Even
a payment made under mistake cannot be recovered where the defendant holds ex aequo et bono. If the offerer labored under so curious
11.
43 et

Woodward, Quasi-Contracts, § 20 Ct seq.; Keener, Quasi-Contracts,
eq.

p.
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an assumption it may be that he had in mind deposits required to
be made to back up offers or bids for public contracts, for statutes
with reference to public contracts sometimes specifically declare the
2
By the statute a gratuitous undertaking
bids or offers irrevocable.'
may be rendered obligatory. Most public contract statutes require a
deposit with the offer, and whether the offer is expressly declared irrevocable or not, the statute is usually construed as forfeiting the
deposit even where the offerer asks to withdraw his bid before the bids
are opened or before the public body is bound on its side, where the
latter refuses to permit withdrawal, makes the award and the bidder

refuses to enter into a formal contract.' 3

D. 0. McGovney.
CORPORATION-s-DIsREGARD OF CORPORATE ENTITY WHERE CORPORATION
AND STOCKHOLDER BEAR THE RELATION OF PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. MER-

CANTILE TRUST Co. v. DoNK.'-The existence of a corporate entity has
often been invoked by individuals as a disguise for fraud or as an
instrument of oppression and wrong. In such cases, courts of equity
and frequently courts of law- have unhesitatingly looked behind the
corporate entity and have taken cognizance of the character, intent,
motives and obligations of the individuals who compose the corporation. A brief summary of typical cases will illustrate the principles
upon which the courts have proceeded in this regard. Where a person organized a corporation to do an act which if done by himself
would have been a violation of a contract, the court refused to heed
his contention that the corporation not himself was the actor." Where
the same body of stockholders controlled two corporations and the
affairs of the two companies were so conducted as to make one the
mere adjunct or instrumentality of the other, it was held that the
two corporations were identical so as to render the property of the
4
It should be observed
one liable for the debts owed by the other.
Baltimore v. Robinson Construction Co. (1.914) 123 Md. 660, 91 At],
Baltimore v. Itobinsou Construclion Co., supra: Wheaton
Buildhig 4
Lumber Co. v. Boston (1910) 204 MAlss. 218. 90 N. E. 59: Robinson v. Board
of Education (1901) 91 II. App. 100 (where the instructions to hidders expresslv provided that the deposit should be forfeited If the hid were withdrawn before a stated time). See also, Tinner v. Fremont (1909) 170 Fed.
259: Kimball v. Hewitt (1888) 2 N. Y. Supp. 697: Daris v. Sotracuse (1910)
126 N. Y. Supp. 1002. Cf. New York v. Scely-Taylor Co. (1912) 133 N. Y. Supp.
808.
682.

12.
13.

1. (191.5) 178 S. W. 113.
2. Booth v. Bunco (1865) 33 N. Y. 139: Brundrcd v. Rice (1892) 49 Ohio
1-. 640, 32 N. E. 169; Donovan v. Purtcll (1905) 216 Il1. 629, 75 N. E.
334.. 3.
Mtoore & Iraondley Hdm. Co. v. 'ourers Ifordiv're Co. 418SS) 87 Ala.
206,
6 So. 41 (semble) : Beal v. Chase (1875) 31 Mich. 490: LePagc Co. v. Russia
941: lagy v. McGuivc (1892) 147 Pa. St. 187, 23
51
Fed.
(1892)
Co.
Cement
AtI. 4.
806.
Donoan v. PIrtell (1905) 216 111. 629. 75 N, E.3.4: fn re Muncie
Pulp Co. (1905) 139 Fed. 546, 71 C. C. A. 530; it? re Ricqer, Ka er u- Altuark (1907) 157 Fed. 009.
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here that mere identity of stockholders is not in itself sufficient to
justify a disregard of the separate personalities of the two corporations;
it must appear that the affairs of both are so managed and interrelated
5
The same principles
as to make them in reality but one concern.
of course apply when an individual or partnership makes a similar
use of the corporate organization. Where a person with the intent to
hinder and delay creditors forms a corporati6n and conveys his property to it in return for stock, the courts refuse to be bound by the
entity theory and will either compel a reconveyance or administer
8
Nor
the property for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation.
will the courts tolerate the evasion of statutes by the aid of the device
of incorporation. Thus where a shipper corporation owned and controlled another corporation which received commissions which were
really illegal rebates, it was held that the two corporations were identical so as to make the receipt of rebates by the "dummy" corporation
a receipt by the shipper.7 Attempts to evade the antitrust statutes
have in the main been equally unsuccessful. Trusts have been dissolved on the principle that the acts and contracts of the persons
holding all the stock are to be considered the acts and contracts of
the corporation itself where the effect is the same as tho the corporaSimilarly, "holding
tion had acted or contracted as a corporation.
companies" have been compelled to divest themselves of stock transferred to them in pursuance of the agreement of the stockholders of
9
the companies sought to be combined. Clearly the authorities warrant
the statement that "a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity
as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears;
but when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
10
corporation as an association of persons".
Trust
Company v. Donk the
of
Mercantile
In the recent case
question of regarding the corporate entity was presented in an apparently novel situation which was complicated by the law of suretyship
and of negotiable instruments. A hypothetical statement of the case
may serve to bring into clearer relief the issue there presented. A, B, C,
5. Gramophone d Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley (1906) 2 K. B. 856, (1908)
Lange v. Burke (1901) 69 Ark. 85, 61 S. W. 165; Waycross Air-Line R. Co. v.
Offerman A W. R. Co. (1900) 109 Ga. 827, 35 S. E. 275.
6. 'Bank v. Trebein (1898) 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834; 3 Cook, Corporations (7th ed.) § 672.
7. U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co. (1905) 142 Fed. 247.
8. State v. Standard Oil Co. (1892) 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. F. 279; People v. North River Sugar Refining Co. (1890) 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834:
Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People (1895) 156 II. 448, 41 N. 'E. 188;
State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. (1910) 110 MAinn. 415, 126 N, W. 126.
9. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1903) 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep.
436.
10.
SANBORN, J., in U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co. (1905)
142 Fed. 247. On this general subject see an excellent article by Professor
Wormser, "Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity," 12 Columbia Law Review, 496.
2 K. B. 89; In re Watertown Paper Go. '(1909) 169 Fed. 252, 94 C. C. A. 528;
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D, and E, the sole shareholders in and directors of corporation X,
endorsed a note given by X to M as collateral security for a loan made
by M to X. A warehouse receipt covering goods of X was given to
M as additional collateral. Later M surrendered the warehouse receipt
to X. Are A and B thereby released pro tanto, assuming that their
endorsement rendered them liable as sureties and that they did not
consent to the surrender? Now, suppose transactions take place between M and X which constitute an extension of time and an alteration of the contract without the sureties' consent. In considering
whether A and B are thereby released, are they to be treated as voluntary sureties or, having regard to the fact that they with the other
directors received the entire benefit of the loafi, as sureties for consideration? Under the latter alternative, A and B would come within
the rule peculiarly applicable to surety companies by which a surety's
right to stand upon the strict terms of his contract is abridged.
The answer of the court to the first question seems to be a clear
disregard of the entity theory. It is said that "the defendants have
been the recipients of every dollar borrowed and of this 8500 tons of
ice [covered by the warehouse receipt], and have not lost a cent of it,
while the plaintiff has received nothing except the interest", and that
therefore it would be Inequitable to allow the defendants to take advantage of the release of the security. Were this a suit against the
directors individually to enforce the corporate obligation against them
as being in reality the corporation, no authority whatever can be
found which would allow the corporate existence to be so ignored.
The corporation appears to have been duly organized for legitimate
purposes and no element of fraud or Improper use of the corporate
organization enters Into the case. But if, arising as the case does, it
would be harsh and inequitable to allow the defendants the benefit
of their defense, then no fondness for the entity theory should permit
that result. The equities of the situation, however, do not, It seems,
favor the plaintiffs so clearly as the court thinks. It Is true that the
defendants would have participated to the extent of stock held in
whatever profit the loan brings and also in the proceeds of the goods
surrendered, but should that benefit be forced upon them when it
may occasion a much greater loss? If A and B are compelled to pay,
they may be unable to indemnify themselves out of the corporate
assets and thus may be compelled to bear not only their own share
of the corporate debt, but also that of the other directors, when, but
for M's act of releasing the securities, they would have been protected to some extent at least. It is a possible and not unlikely situation that the corporation was in debt, that the stock held by A and
B was fully paid up, and that the company never paid a dividend after
the loan was contracted.
In such case A and B would have been
benefited in no way by the loan, except possibly remotely by the en-
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hancement of the value of their stock. Under these considerations,
it is by no means clear that a disregard of the corporate entity should
deprive A and B of the defense ordinarily available to sureties.
In answer to the second proposition the court says that A and B
are sureties for consideration because "the sureties received the entire
benefit of the $25,000 borrowed from the plaintiff; and the mere fact
that the money was placed in their corporate pockets instead of in their
individual coffers should not affect their liability...
". Here
again the language points to a disregard of the separate existence of
the corporation. It seems somewhat inconsistent to regard the loan as
in reality made to the individuals who composed the corporation and
then to use that view to give to those individuals the character of
sureties for profit. If the "corporate pocket" and the "individual coffers" are in truth one and the same receptacle for the income of the
defendants, the defendants are principals and not in any sense sureties.
Further, no authority exists for holding that anticipated dividends
supply a consideration so as to make a stockholder a surety for hire.
The rule of strictissimi juris has been relaxed only as against surety
companies and that limitation is based upon the fact that those companies are organized for the purpose of being sureties, drawing their
own contracts, specifying in minute details the conditions of their
liability and charging rates based upon the risk assumed. They are
therefore considered as insurers and are released by the action of the
creditor only when their risk has been materially increased."
The
same reasons do not apply to a suretyship contract of the type represented by the principal case.
It should be stated that the court did not rest the decision of the
case wholly upon its views as to these two questions. It held at the
beginning that the defendants were liable, not as sureties but as indorsers, and that therefore the rules of suretyship do not apply. Authorities are cited to prove that indorsers are not within the statute
authorizing sureties to give notice to the creditors to bring suit. But
these cases do not hold that an indorser is in no respect a surety
nor do they deny that an indorser like a surety is discharged by an
agreement to extend time, an alteration of the contract, or pro tanto
by the creditor's surrender of security. The nature of the defendants'
liability on their indorsement, as well as the other questions involved
in the case, are not attempted to be worked out, as they do not fall
within the scope of this note.
D. H. L.
DEDICATION AS A RESULT OF USER.

CARPENTER V. ST. JOSEPH.-In

Carpenter v. St. Joseph,' the Supreme Court was confronted with the
11. Rule v. Anderson (1912) 160 Mo. App. 347, 142 S. W. 358; Lackland
v. Renshaw (1913) 256 Mo. 133, 165 S. W. 314; Young v. American Bonding
Co. (1910) 228 Pa. 373, 77 A.
623.
1.
(1915)174 S. W. 53.
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question whether a dedication of land will result from its being used
by the public, in the absence of more positive evidence of an intention
on the owner's part to dedicate it to the public. The plaintiff's predecessor in title had graded a path across the land in question for foot
passengers, and it had been used for intermittent public travel for a
number of years. This travel was on several occasions interrupted
by fences which were soon torn down by boys. The owners had
apparently continued to pay taxes on the land thruout the period of
the public's use. The court enjoined the defendant from grading
the land for a street, holding that there were no facts in the case which
would authorize a finding that there had been a common law dedication. It seems to have been thought that a dedication by user could
be accomplished only where the user is adverse.
The dedication of land to public use can be effected only where
the owner gives clear expression of his intention to dedicate it. This
expression may be found in a deed, or in a petition to have a way
opened or in acts of the owner. Where the expression is in the acts
of the owner, clearer proof is required and since the intention can only
be inferred, the acts must unequivocally point to it. Thus merely
leaving a lane thru one's farm for one's own convenience and permitting
the public to use it as a highway, are not sufficient to show an intention on the owner's part to dedicate the land.2 But where an owner
of land conveys to another a part thereof and describes it as abutting
upon a street when there is no such street, but a strip of the grantor's
land answering to a street is left abutting the tract conveyed, the intention to dedicate the strip sufficiently appears.3
So also will acquiescence by the owner in the public use show
an intention to dedicate when coupled with other facts such as setting
aside part of his land as a highway, 4 or making such statements as
would lead the public to believe the land is dedicated. 5 But acquiescence in the public use when unaccompanied by other acts is not
sufficient evidence of an intention to dedicate even tho the user was
for the statutory period.6 The existence of such an intention may be
rebutted in a variety of ways, such as by the owner's paying taxes
thereon, making conveyances of the land, 8 or erecting bars and gates
thereon to prevent the use of the land.9 The owner himself is not
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
133, 35

Kansas City, etc. Ry. v. Woolard (1894) 60 Mo. App. 631.
Field v. Mark (1894) 125 Mo. 502. 28 S. V. 1004.
New Orleass, etc. Ry. Co. v. Moye (1860) 39 Miss. 374.
Wilder v. St. Paul (1866) 12 Minn. 192.
Stacey v. Miller (1851) 14 Mo. 478; Lewis v. Portland (1893) 25 Ore.
Pac. 256; Weiss v. South Bethlehem (1890) 136 Pa. St. 294, 20 AtI.

801.
7. Baman v. Boeckeler (1893) 119 Mo. 189, 24 S. W. 207; Mause8r v.
State (1878) 60 Md. 357; Topeka v. Cowee (1891) 48 Kan. 345, 29 Pac. 560;
Case v. Favier (1882) 12 Minn. 89.
8. Hall v. Baltimore (1880) 56 Md. 187.
9. Joles v. Phillips (1894) 59 Ark. 35, 26 S. W. 386; People v. Reed (1889)
81 Cal. 70, 22 Pac. 474.
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allowed in Missouri to testify that he did not intend by his acts to
express an intention to dedicate. 10
An acceptance is necessary to complete the dedication proposed
by the landowner."
In some jurisdictions an acceptance is presumed
if the dedication is purely beneficial, but as the dedication of a highway
imposes the burden of keeping it in repair, no presumption of acceptance can arise in such cases.2" There is conflict as to whether mere
user on the part of the public constitutes the necessary acceptance,
some jurisdictions requiring an express acceptance by the proper officers." The prevailing view is that where land is dedicated to public
use no formal acceptance is necessary, mere user by the public being
sufficient. 1 4 In many jurisdictions a distinction is made between the
effect of user as evidence of acceptance against one who dedicates his
land to public use, and as against the public authorities so as to
charge them with the burden or repair. The weight of authority
is that user is not sufficient for the latter purpose, some ordinance or
assumption of jurisdiction over the way in question being necessary."
Where there is an express dedication, or the owner's intent is
clearly shown, the use by the public necessary to raise an implied
acceptance need not be for the same period of time as is required when
a title is sought to be established by adverse user alone. 16 There are
four views as to the length of time necessary to amount to an acceptance of the owner's offer of dedication. In North Carolina any user is
sufficient. 17 In some jurisdictions user for a reasonable length of time
is all that is required. "I A third view, which is followed in Missouri
is that a user for such length of time and under such circumstances
that the public accommodation and public rights might be materially
affected by an interruption of the enjoyment, constitutes an accept.

10.

Perkins v. Fielding (1893)

119 Mo. 149, 24 S. W. 444.

Contra; Good-

fellow v. Riggs (1893) 88 Ia.540, 55 N. W. 319; Relim v. Mcolure (1895) 107
Cal. 199,
11.
12.
Ill. App.

13.

40 Pac. 437.
Kemper v. Collins (1888) 97 Mo. 644, 11 S. W. 245.
Wayne v. Miller (1895) 31 Mich. 447; IVilley v. Illinois (1889)
609.
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O'Connell v. Bowman (1891) 45 111. App, 654; Dicken v. Liverpool
Salt Co. (1895) 41 W. Va. 511, 23 S. E. 582.
14. Adams V. Iron Co. (1889) 78 Mich. 271, 44 N. W. 270; Gillean v.
Forest (1901) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 371, 61 S. W. 345; Ray v. Nally (1905) 28
Ky. 421, 89 S.W. 486; Mobile v. Fowler (1906) 147 Ala. 403, 41 So. 468.
15. Downend v. Kansas City (1900) 156 Mo. 60, 56 S. W. 902; Curran v.
St. Joseph (1910) 143 Mo. App. 618, 128 S. W. 203; Drimmel v. Kansas City
(1914) 180 Mo. App. 339, 168 S. W. 280; Winchester v. Carrol (1901) 99 Va.
727, 40 S. E. 37; Downing v. Coatesville (1906) 214 Pa. 291, 63 Atl. 696:
Besse nier v. Carroll (1908) Ala. 45 So. 419; Jones V. Boston (1909) 201 Mass.
267, 87 N. E. 589. Contra: Beaudean v. Cape Girardeau (1880) 71 Mo. 392:
Mans v. Springfield (1890) 101 Mo. 613, 14 S. W. 630; Elliott, Highways (2d
ed.) § 154.

16. Ross v. Thompson (1881) 78 Md. 90; Bauman v. Boeckeler (1893)
119 Mo. 189, 24 S. W. 207; K. C. Milling Co. v. Riley (1895) 133 Mo. 574.
34 S. W. 835 : Stewart v. Conley (1897) 122 Ala. 179, 27 So. 303.
17. Cranp v. Minis (1870) 64 N. C. 767.
18. Parsonsv. Atlanta University (1871) 44 Ga. 529.
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ance of the dedication. " The fourth view is that user for a period
equal to the period of limitation is conclusive evidence of acceptance.20
The Missouri statute 21 provides a method of dedication, which
differs from the common law methods in that no acceptance Is necessary to complete it. 22 Statutory dedication is brought about by filing
a plat of a city or an addition thereto, designating certain streets and
ways for public use. As a result of the filing of such a plat, the ways
so specified become dedicated without more. The statutory dedication
purports to pass the fee, 2 3 while the effect of dedication in general
is to give the public a mere easement or right of way over the land.
The public may acquire an Interest in land by prescription. If the
land is used openly, notoriously, adversely and continuously for the
statutory period, and such user is acquiesced in by the owner, the public gains a prescriptive easement. 24 Many of the cases in which such
user is established, speak of the land as dedicated to public use. Dedication requires an expressed or implied Intention on the part of the
25
No such Intention appears
owner to donate the land to public use.
when a prescriptive right is gained by adverse user, hence the latter
cannot be a dedication in the absence of the essential elements of a
dedication.
The court in Carpenter v. St. Joseph 21 stated that there was no
act of the owners indicating an intention to dedicate. A street railway
company which at one time owned the land graded a pathway across
It for the convenience of foot passengers. This it would seem is a clear
evidence of an intent to dedicate. If so, the public use of the land
under the Missouri rule 217 was a sufficient acceptance and the land
should have been held dedicated to public use, unless it's effect was
destroyed by the evidence that the taxes were paid by the owner of the
land. The court, however, in reaching the opposite conclusion, seems
to have based its opinion on adverse user and stated that to constitute
19.

San Francisco v. Canavan (1872)

42 Cal. 541; Brinck v. Collier

(1874) 56 Mo. 160; Ross v. ThompsOn (1881) 78 Md. 90; Maywood County
v. Maywood (1886) 118 Il1. 61; ROsenberger v. Miller (1895) 61 Mo. App.

422.

20. Conway v. Jefferson (1866) 46 N. H. 521: Remington v. Millerd (1847)
1 R. I. 93 ; Kennedy v. Mayor of Cumberland (1886) 65 Md. 514, 9 Atl. 234.

23.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 10290 et seq.
Buschman v. St. Louis (1894) 121 Mo. 523, 26 S. W. 687; Brown v.
128 Mo. 10. 30 S. W. 312.
But see 5 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 27.

25.

Field v. Mark (1894) 125 Mo. 502, 28 S. W. 1004: Kansas City, etc.

21.
22.

Carthage (1895)

24. State v. Young (1858) 27 Mo. 259; State v. Walters (1879) 69 Mo.
463; State v. Wells (1879) 70 Mo. 638: Zimmermant v. Snowden (1885) 88 Mo.
218: State v. Proctor (1886) 90 Mo. 334, 2 S. W. 472: Price v. Breekenridge
(1887) 92 Mo. 378, 5 S. AV. 20 ; Banman v: Boeckeler (1893) 119 Mo. 189, 24
S. W. 207: State v. BIaldridge (1893) 53 Mo. App. 415: Rosenberger V. Miller
(1895) 61 Mo. App. 422; State v. Hood (1910) 143 Mo. App. 313, 126 S. W.

992.

Ry. Co. v. Woolard (1894) 60 Mo. App. 631.
26. (Mo., 1915) 174 S. W".53.
27. Brimck v. Collier (1874) 56 Mo. 160; Rosenberger v. Miller (1895)
Mo. App. 422.
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a dedication by adverse user there must be user under a claim of
right with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner, for a period
equal to that of the statute barring a recovery of land. While the
result which the court reached can be rested on other grounds, it is not
clear that a proper distinction was drawn between dedication and
prescription.
G.' L. D.
RES JUDICATA-EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT
ALLOWING REINSTITUTION OF SUIT.

UNDER

STATUTE

GINoccHIo V. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAIL-

Co.'-This was an action brought by an administrator for the
negligent killing of his intestate. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff in the lower court and the defendant appealed to the St. Louis
Court of Appeals where after thoro Investigation and for causes going
to the merits of the case, the judgment was reversed. At the conclusion
of its opinion, the appellate court said: 2 "It becomes our duty to
reverse the judgment and declare there is no right of recovery." The
plaintiff then, under the statute hereinafter set out, instituted a new
suit "within one year after the said judgment of reversal" and the
trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that such ruling was proper as the petition was predicated upon the same facts as the former petition, judgment on which
had been reversed. The "reversal" mentioned in the statute was held
to mean a reversal in which the merits had not been passed upon.
The statute n in question provides that if the plaintiff begins his
action within the time fixed by the proper statutes of limitations, and
the plaintiff therein suffers a nonsuit, or after verdict for him the
judgment be arrested, or after judgment for him, the same be reversed
on appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence a new action from
time to time, within one year after such nonsuit suffered, or such
judgment arrested or reversed. Another section provides that the
appellate courts may (1) affirm, or (2) reverse, or (3) reverse and
remand for new trial, or (4) reverse with directions to enter a particular judgment, or (5) enter such judgment as the trial court should
have entered. As the statute provides that a new action may be
brought within one year after nonsuit suffered, the question immediately arises as to when plaintiff has "suffered" a nonsuit.5 At common law the plaintiff could take a nonsuit at any time before verdict.6
ROAD

1.
2.

(1915) 175 S. W. 196.
(1910) 155 Mo. App. 163, 134 S. W. 129.

3. RevIsed Statutes 1909, § 1900.
4. Revised Statutes 1909. § 2083.
5. Hewitt v. Steele (1896) 136 Mo. 327. 38 S. W. 82: E.Qtes v. Fry (1901)
166 Mo. 70. 65 S. W. 741. Cf. .Johnson v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis (1912)
243 Mo. 278. 147 S. WV.1077.
6. Outhaoite v. IuIdson (1852) 7 Ex. 380, 21 L. J. Ex. 151; Stewart v.
Gray (1830) 4 Hempst. 94, 23 Fed. Cases. No. 13428a; Peeples v. Root (1873)
48 Ga. 592.
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But this rule Is modified by our statute 7 under which a nonsult must
be taken before the case is submitted to the court or to the jury.
Clearly, then, a reversal is not equivalent to a nonsuit, tho the contrary was held in Stevens Lumber Co. v. Kansas City Lumber Co.0
Stone v. Grand Lodge o1 United Workmen " and Donnell v. Wright,"
as a judgment of reversal comes after a submission and usually after a
consideration of the law and the facts, which adjudication of the issues
is lacking in the event of nonsuit. Tho, as in McQuitty v. Wilhite"
there may be cases wherein there might be a reversal without remanding and yet the issues upon the merits remain untouched.
It being established then that the plaintiff In the principal case
had not suffered a nonsuit, there remains the question as to the effect
of the simple reversal and its relation to his right to institute a new
The kinds and character of the judgments
suit under the statute."
the appellate courts are authorized to enter" must be kept in mind
in considering this question. The language of the statute is not "if
the judgment be reversed and remanded", but "if the judgment be
reversed". A provision for a new action in case a judgment be reversed
and remanded would be a mere redundancy; for obviously under such
a judgment the plaintiff could proceed with his action without the
aid of the statute and without any hindrance from the statute of limitations.
It is a question of policy whether the word "reversed" is to be
limited to those cases of reversal in which the merits of the cause
have not been adjudicated. Little aid can be found in the decisions in
other jurisdictions, for most of the statutes provide that if the action
is commenced within the proper statutory period and the plaintiff fails
in any such action otherwise than on the merits and the time limit shall
have expired, a new action may be commenced within one year after
such failure. '1 The statutes of Arkansas 1" are identical with the stat7
utes of Missouri, and the statutes of Alabama,' of Illinois 18 and of
Indiana 1" are the same in substance. In these states it is held that the
7. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1980.
8. Carrol v. Interstate Rapid Transit Co. (1891) 107 Mo. 653, 17 S. W.
889; Rutledge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1894) 123 Mo. 121, 27 S. W. 327;
Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co. v. Gordon (1903) 173 Mo. 139, 73 S. W
155.
9. (1897) 72 Mo. App. 248.
10. (1905) 117 Mo. App. 295, 92 S. W 1143.
11. (1906) 199 Mo. 304, 97 S. W. 928.
12. (1908) 218 Mo. 586, 117 S. W. 730, and cases cited.
13. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1900.
14. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2083.
15. Kansas General Statutes 1909, § 5615; Maine Revised Statutes 1908, c.
83, § 94; New York Code of Civil Procedure 1906, § 405; Wilson's Oklahoma
Revised Statutes 1903, § 4216-4221: Page & Adams Ohio General Code 1910, §
11233; Shannon's Tennessee Code 1906, c. 127, § 12.
16. Arkansas Statutes 1884. § 4497.
17. Alabama Code 1896, § 2806.
18. Hnrd's Illinois Revised Statutes 1903. c. 83, § 25.
19. Burns Indiana Annotated Statutes 1908, § 301.
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purpose of such statutes is to make an exception to the general statutes
of limitations; and that they are intended to reach only those cases
where suit is brought and the merits of the action are not tried, and
the period of limitation expires while the suit is pending. In accordance with this doctrine, LAMM, J.,20 says: "A broad view of this section- 2 ' a view that takes in as well the remedy to be advanced as
the mischief to be retarded . . . but goes to the weightier matter of
the law-shows that it was in the legislative mind that a litigant
should have a day in court-a trial on the merits of his cause. If the
proceedings fell short of that, if the judgment was arrested, or if for
plaintiff and reversed on error or appeal, or if some interlocutory matter supervened and thwarted a trial on the merits, then the prescribed
period of the statute of limitations . . . should be extended for one
year". It must be stated in this connection, however, that a judgment to
be conclusive as an estoppel between the parties to a suit, need not have
been a formal judgment upon a hearing of the Issues; nor does it
matter that the decision was rendered on a demurrer or upon a mere
motion. If the merits were involved and adjudicated the decision
is final.2 2
Upon any other interpretation of the statute, there would be no
end of litigation, assuming, of, course, that the courts will continue
the practice of simple reversal,'2 for it is to be observed that the statute uses the words "from time to time;" and if a suit may be reinstituted after one reversal, why not after each subsequent reversal?
The, ordinarily, it seems, a judgment of reversal is only final when
it also enters or directs the entry of a judgment which disposes of
the case, 24 it must be concluded such statutes are not intended to
affect the principle of res judicata, for where the appellate court reverses for causes going to the merits, and the reversal shows an intention to finally decide the case upon the merits, the judgment is
20.
Vetmore v. Crouch (1905) 188 Mo. 647, 87 S. W. 954. To the same
effect, Roland v. Logan, 18 Ala. 207: Napier v. Foster, 80 Ala. 379 ; Little Rock,
etc. RP. Co. v. Alavees (1887) 49 Ark. 248. 4 S. W. 778: AlcAndrews v. Chicago,
etc., Rg. Co. (1908) 162 Fed. 856, 89 C. C. A. 546; McKinnely v. Springer (1851)

3 Ind. 59, 63 (seeble). In 19 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d. ed.) p. 262,
it is said ; "The original English statutes and most of the statutes in the United
States provide for a new action where a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed
on appeal or writ of error. But since these statutes have reference purely to
the question of limitations, and are not Intended to affect the rules of res
judica a, manifestly the reversal must be on some ground not affecting or coneluding the merits of the cause of action."
21. Revised Statutes 1899, § 4285, now Revised Statutes 1909, § 1900.
22. Johnson V. United Rys. Co. (1912) 243 Mo. 278, 147 S. W. 1077.
Cf. Spencer v. Watkins (1909) 169 Fed. 379, 94 C. C. A. 659.
23. Caroll v. Interstate Transit Co. (1891) 107 Mo 653, 17 S. WV.889;
Ruttledge v. Missouri Pacific Rg. Co. (1894) 123 Mo. 121, 24 S. W. 1053; Keown v.
St. Louis R. It. Go. (1807) 141 Mo. 86, 41 S. W. 926.
24. Stone v. Grand Lodge of United Workman of Al0. (1905) 117 Mo. App.
295, 92 S. W. 1143; Atkinson v. Dixon (1888) 96 Mo. 582, 10 S. W. 163 ; Donnell v. Wright (1906) 199 Mo. 304, 97 S. W. 928: Smith v. Frankfleld (1879)
77 N. Y. 414; Smith v. Adams (1889) 130 U. S. 167, 9 Sup. Ct. 566; Specs v.
Boggs (1903)

204 Pa. St. 504, 54 Ati. 346.
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taken to be a bar to a new action.25 And the scarcity of cases on the
question indicates that this, with practical unanimity, has been the
understanding of the bar for over one hundred years.2
But there is
the language intimating the contrary in Estes v. Fry,7 where Marshall, J., delivering the opinion of the court said, concerning the application of this statute: "The one year here allowed means one year
after judgment is entered for a nonsuit, in arrest, or for a reversal, and
this is true whether such judgment Is entered in the trial or appellate
court".
No decisive reason has been advanced why the privilege of commencing a new action within one year should not equally apply to all of
the situations mentioned in the statute. It is submitted that a literal
interpretation of the statute would admit of a new action within one
year after a judgment merely of reversal. The wording of the statute
is so clear that It would seem that any mischief which might result
from its provisions should be avoided by the legislature. The question
might be obviated by an addition to the statute providing for the new
action where a case has been disposed of otherwise than on the merits.
This step seems to have been taken by the Missouri court without the
interference of the legislature, and it is improbable that the decisions
will be disturbed. All difficulty can be avoided if the appellate courts
will proceed to enter or direct a judgment at the time of reversal. On
the principle of stare decisis the new action would probably be disposed of in accordance with the disposition made in the former case;
so that the final result would seldom be different even if the new action
were entertained.
3. C. S..
TRESPASS BY CHICKENS-EFFECT OF INCLOSURE ACT. EVANS V. MCBy the early common law of England the owner of domestic
animals was bound to confine them to his own close and was liable,
irrespective of negligence, for their trespasses upon the land of another
whether such land was fenced or not.2 This rule had an obvious foundation in public policy in thickly populated communities devoted to
agriculture. One exception to the rule was that in the absence of negligence and provided he removed them in a reasonable time, the owner
of animals was not liable for their trespasses while being driven along
LAIN. '

25. Strotman v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (1910) 228 Mo. 154, 128 S. W.
187: Ginocehio v. Illinois Central Ry. Co. (1915) 175 S. AV. 196; Johnson v.
United Rys. Go, (1912) 243 Mo. 278, 147 S. W. 1077.
Cf. Rutledge v. A!o. Pac.
Ry. Co. (1894) 1.23 Mo. l21. 24 S. W. 1053; United Shoe Machinery Co. V.
Rnilose (1910) 231 Mo. 508, 132 S. W. 1133.
26.
Ginocchio v. Illinois, etc.. 11y. Co. (1915) 175 S. W. 196, 197. Revised
Statutes 1909, § 1900, baving its origin in 1807. Vide Territorial Laws, p. 144, § 2.
27.
(1901) 166 Mo. 70, 81, 65 S. W. 741.

ed.)

1.
(1915) 175 S. W. 294.
2. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries (Cooley's 3d ed.) p. 211 ; Cooley, Torts (2d
p. 397.
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The common law principle applied to adjoining landthe highway.
owners unless by statute, prescription, or agreement an obligation to
4
All domestic animals
maintain a partition fence had been imposed.
subject to ownership were included within the operation of the common law rule, except dogs and cats, 5 and while no cases have been
found in which an action was brought for the trespass of chickens,
these presumably fall within the rule as to domestic animals. Blackstone speaks of domestic animals as being "horses, kine, sheep, poultry
and the like";" and chickens come within his definition of domitae
naturae or "such animals as we generally see tame and are seldom if
7
Then there is a dictum by WILever found wandering at large".
LIAMS, 3., in Cox v. Burbridge I that "if a man's cattle, or sheep, or
poultry stray into his neighbor's land or garden, and do such damage
as might ordinarily be expected to be done by things of that sort, the
owner is liable to his neighbor for the consequences". Dicta in two
American cases I support this conclusion as to trespasses by chickens.
When one's premises were invaded by the animals of another, the
landowner at common law could drive them from his close by the use
of reasonable means, but was liable to their owner for injuries inflicted upon them by the use of unnecessary force or means in expelling them. 1o He might also distrain them damage feasant until
compensated for the damage sustained by their trespass. 11
The common law rule as to the liability of the owner of animals
for their trespasses without regard to negligence still prevails in England, 12 and in a few states in this country. In a number of the states,
however, the principle has been declared either inapplicable or abrogated by the fencing laws. '1 The Missouri statute of inclosures was
first enacted in 1808, 14 providing that all fields should be inclosed with
fences of certain specifications, and making the proprietor of certain
animals liable for damages occasioned by their trespass thru such
lawful fence. This is substantially our present statute of inclosures. 11
The Missouri courts have held that this act abrogated the common law
principle and that owners of certain domestic animals need not fence
them in and are not liable for their trespass upon either unenclosed
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Tillett v. Ward (1882) 10 Q. B. D. 17.
Cooley, Torts, (2d ed.) p. 398; Pollock, Torts (9th ed.) p. 509.
Read v. Edwards (1864) 17 C. B. (N. s.) 224, 260.
2 Blackstone, Commentaries (Cooley's 3d ed.) p. 387.
2 Blackstone, Commentaries (Cooley's 3d ed.) p. 390.
(1863) 13 C. B. (N. S.) 430, 437.
Johnson v. Patterson (1840) 14 Conn. 1; Clark v. Keliher (1871)

Mass. 406.
10. Hcald v. Grier (1857) 12 Mo. App. 556.
11. State V. Neal (1897) 120 N. C. 613 (chickens).
12.
13.
Animals,
14.
15.
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Clark & Lindseil. Torts (6th ed.) p. 479.
For the law of the various states upon this question, see lngham,
§§ 70, 71.
Laws of Louisiana Territory, p. 276.
Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 6454, 6455, 6456.
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7
The
lands 16 or land not fenced according to statutory requirements.'
leading case upon this subject is Gorman v. Pacific Railroad16 in which
cattle belonging to the plaintiff went upon the defendant's right of way
not fenced according to the statute, and were killed by the defendant's
"It has always been our understanding as
engine. The court said:
to law in this state that our statute concerning inclosures entirely abrogated that principle of the common law which exempted the proprietor of land from the obligation of fencing it and imposed on the
owner of animals the duty of confining them to his own premises";
the defendant was held liable on the ground of negligence toward the
trespassing cattle. In the Missouri cases the abrogation of the common
law rule has always been assigned to the statute of inclosures, 11 and
it does not, as in some states, rest upon judicial determination independently of statute. 20
The first statute of inclosures provided for the liability of the
owner of "any horse, gelding, mare, colt, mule or ass, sheep, lamb,
goat, kid, or cattle . . . or hog, shote, or pig 21 for the trespass of
such animal thru a lawful fence. In 1835, 22 "horse, cattle, or other
stock . . . or hog" was substituted for the long list of animals in
the earlier law, and in 188921 hogs were dropped, leaving the section
as it now is, viz., the owner of "horses, cattle, or other stock" will be
liable for their trespass thru a statutory fence. 24 In 1885, to the
specification of the fence was added a requirement that such fence must
be sufficient "to resist horses, cattle, swine and like stock", and the
act provided that in districts where swine are restrained from running
While
at large, a fence of other dimensions would be sufficient. 25
courts have defined "stock" as "domestic animals or beasts usually
raised on a farm, 25 which would include chickens, in cases involvipg
the interpretation of the word they have applied the term only to ani-

16. Kertz v. Dolde (1879) 7 Mo.
17. Mana v. lvilliamson (1879)
(1885) 19 Mo. App. 156.
18. (1858) 26 Mo. 441. At that
greater duty to fence their land than
nibal & St. Joseph By.

(1865)

36 Mo.

App. 564.
70 Mo. 661;

Fenton

v.

Montgomery

time, 1858, the railroads were under no
any other proprietor. In Clark v. Han202, 220.

it

was said

that apart from

the statute of inclosures the owners of cattle would be liable for damages caused
See also Hannibal d St.
to trains consequent to striking trespassing cattle.
Joseph Ry. v. Kenny (1867) 41 Mo. 271. Our present statute imposing an absolute duty of fencing upon railway companies, Revised Statutes 1909. § 3145,

was enacted in 1877, and is not affected by the adoption of the stock law,
Revised Statutes 1909, § 777.
19. See Heald v. Grier (1857) 12 Mo. App. 446: Clark v. Hannibal & St.
JC e(li Ry. (1805) 36 Mo. 202: McLean v. Berkabile (1907) 123 Mo. App. 647.
652.
20. Seeley v. Peters (1848) 10 I1. 130; Baford v. Houtz (1890) 133 U.
S. 320: Comerford v. Duprey (1861) 17 Cal. 308.
21. Laws of Louisiana Territory. p. 276, § 2.
22. Revised Statutes 1835, p. 311.
23. Revised Statutes 1889, § 5084.
24. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6456.
25. Laws of 1885, p. 166. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6455.
26. The definition is from Webster's Dictionary. State v. Clark (1884)
65 Iowa 336, 21 N. W. 666: Inman v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. I'aul Ry. Co.
(1883) 60 Iowa 459, 15 N. W. 286.
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mals popularly considered as coming within it, viz., horses, 21 mules,
asses, cattle, 2 hogs, sheep or goats, but not poultry or other fowls.
As no law has been passed expressly adding to or taking from the list of
animals against which one is bound to fence, the changed expression is
probably due only to the simplification processes used in revising the
statutes from time to time. "Horses, cattle and other stock", then
would include only the animals enumerated in the original statute.
Since chickens or other fowls were not named in the original inclosure
statute and are not now comprehended in the term "stock", it follows
that by the statute of inclosures the trespass of chickens has never
been actionable in this state. The facts that a statutory fence must
be sufficient "to resist horses, cattle, swine, and like stock", 28 and that
chickens cannot be kept off one's land by the statutory fence, support
this conclusion.
While the courts have stated obiter that the common law principle as to animals generally is not in force here, a distinction might
have been made as to the animals included in its abrogation. That is,
as the abrogation of the common law is solely statutory, the landowner
should be required to fence only against the animals named in the
statute and properly restrainable by a statutory fence. In Canefox v.
Crenshaw, 80 the defendant was held not liable for killing the plaintiff's vicious buffalo which had come upon his land, and the court said
that "if in the construction of our statute of inclosures, we hold that
a party must fence his field with a lawful fence before he can complain of the damage of others, we must of course limit this immunity
to the domestic animals enumerated in the statute against which he
is bound to fence". Until the principal case was decided, the only cases
decided by the courts have been those involving the trespasses of animals included in the inclosure statute and there is no intimation in
the cases, with the exception of the dictum in Canefox v. Crenshaw
noted, that the common law might still be in force as to animals not
named in the statute. 31
27.

Contra, Dudly v. Dening (1867) 34 Conn. 169.

28. "Cattle" includes all domestic quadrupeds. State v. Lawn (1883) 80
Mo. 241; State V. Prater (1908)" 130 Mo. App. 348. The term cattle has been

held to include hogs, State v. Pruett (1895) 61 Mo. App. 156; and goats, State

V. Grove& (1896) 119 N. C. 822; 25 S. E. 819; and sheep. See Jackson v. Fulton
(1901) 87 Mo. App. 228.
29. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6455.
30. (1857) 24 MNo.199, 203.
31. In Leach v. Lynch (1910) 144 Mo. App.

391, It

was stated

that

in counties where goats were not restrained from running at large under Re-

vised Statutes 1909, Art. V., c. 6, such an animal was not a trespasser. The
court said that, "domestic animals are commoners and have a right to run at
large," but the cases cited in support of the dictum are those involving the

trespass of animals named in the statute of inclosures. As the land upon which
the goat trespassed was not enclosed by a fence of statutory requirements, and
as a goat is included in the term "stock", State v. Groves (1896) 119 N. C.
822, 25 S. li. 819, for whose trespasses one cannot recover unless he has a lawful fence, the case falls within the statute of inclosures and, hence, does not
decide that the common law rule applies to animals not named In the inclosure
law, altho the dictum is to that effect.
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But our statute of Inclosures has been held to apply only to outside fences, 32 and where the lands of adjoining proprietors are enclosed by a continuous outside fence, or as it is usually stated, the adjoining lands are under a common inclosure, the common law is still
in force in the absence of the erection and maintenance of a division
fence, under the statute "1 or a contract. 1, Thus in GWlespie v. Hendren, 35 where the lands of the plaintiff and defendant, not separated
by a partition fence, were surrounded by the fences of adjoining proprietors, It was held that the plaintiff could recover rent for the grazing
of the defendant's cattle which passed from his land to the plaintiff's.
So if A's cattle trespass on the adjoining land of B, not directly from
the premises of A but by way of the highway or land of C, A is not
liable to B unless the animals broke thru B's lawful fence; but if they
pass immediately from A's land to B's, A is liable for their trespass
unless the lands were divided by a lawful fence erected according to
statute or agreement.
As the abrogation of the common law liability of the owner of
certain animals for their trespasses by the statute of inclosures leaves
a question as to the liability of owners of animals not named therein,
so the abrogation of the common law as to adjoining proprietors In a
common inclosure by the laws regarding division fences raises a similar question. No cases have been found on this point but it is very
likely that when the case arises, the court will reach a result as to
Inside fences similar to that reached regarding outside fences.
In 1883 the statute was enacted allowing local option on the
subject of restraining the running at large of animals of the species
of horse, mule, ass, cattle, swine, sheep or goat, 3 -or any one of these .
Where the option has been exercised, it is unlawful for the owners of
any animals so restrained to allow them to run at large and landowners
need not fence against them. Tho analogous to the common law, 11
the statute does not restore the common law and one suing for damage
occasioned by the trespass must sue under the statute; 11 and the rights
and duties of adjoining landowners within a common inclosure are not
affected by the adoption of the stock law but remain as at common
law. The liability of the owner of animals which trespass while being
32.

33.
34.

.8.8.

Reddick v. Newburn (1882)

76 Mo. 423.

Revised Statutes 1909. c. 47.
fackson v. 1lufton (1901) 87 Me. App. 228.
(1901) 98 Mo. App. 622.

36. Where the act has been adopted, geese are to be restrained. Revised
Statutes 1909, § 790.
37. Revised Statutes 1909, c. 6, art. V. A similar act of 1873 was declared
unconstitutional In Lammert v. Lidenell (1876) 62 Mo. 188, on the ground that
It delegated a law-making power to the people.

This difficulty is avoided In the

present law by declaring the provisions of the act suspended until the voters of
any one county or any five townships in any one county have accepted the
same at a special election.
38. Rinehart v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Go. (1904)
451, 80 S. W. 910.
39. JacksOn v. Flton (1901) 87 Mo. App. 228.
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driven along a highway is probably the same today under the statute
now in force " as by the common law. 41
In Evans v. McLalin,4 " the plaintiff, an adjacent landowner to the
defendant, sued for damages for the trespass of chickens belonging to
the latter which came on the former's land and damaged his garden
and crops. There was no division fence between the premises of the
parties, nor were the lands of the two adjoining owners surrounded
by a common outside fence. 4
The court affirmed a judgment of
the trial court sustaining a demurrer to the petition and held the defendant not liable for the depredations of his chickens. This is the
first case found in this state which holds the owner of animals not
named in the statute of inclosures not liable for their trespass. The
principal ground of the decision is that the common law liability of
the owner of animals for their trespasses is inapplicable because it is
of a nature local to England and not sufficiently general to be in force
in this state. "
But the cases cited in support of this holding are
Gorman v. Pacific Railroad,41 Hill v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., "
McPheeters v. Hannibal d St Joseph Ry. Co. 17 and McLean v. Berkabile, t8.all of which involve trespass by animals included within the inclosure and division fence laws-"horses, cattle, or other stock". Thus
while the effect of the decision is the application of the inclosure statute to animals not enumerated therein, the case does not expressly so
hold, and the decision was placed on another ground, viz., the inapplicability of the common law rule in general to conditions in Missouri.
Other grounds of the decision are the absence of precedent and the
legislative interpretation of the law as to liability for the trespass of
chickens;
but these reasons do not seem conclusive" and would not
have prevented a decision that the owner of chickens was liable for
their trespasses on the ground that the inclosure law abrogated the
common law only as to animals enumerated in the statute.
In the beginning of the opinion, STURGES, J., states the question
of the case to be "whether under the laws of this state, the owner of
40.
41.
42.

Revised Statutes 1909. § 778.

7 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 27, note 94.

(1915) 175 S.W. 294.

4.. This does not appear from the record but the court says cases involving the liability of such adjacent landowners. O'Itilcy v. Dis (1890) 41
Mo. App. 184; Growney v. 117abash By. (1903) 102 Mo. App. 442, are not applicable.

44.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 8047.

45.
46.
47.
48.

(1858)
(1892)
(1869)
(1907)

26 Mo. 441.
49 Mo. App. 520.
45 Mo. 22.
123 Mo. App. 647.

49. This legislative interpretation that there was no liability apart from

statute being evidenced by the statutes providing for the restraint of geese where
the stock law has been adopted, Revised Statutes 1909, § 790, and allowing

cities and towns to prohibit by ordinance the running at large of chickens.
Revised Statutes 1909. §§ 9229. 9374.
50. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. (1905) 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E.
68; Ross v. Kansas City, etc. fly. (1892)

111 Mo. 18, 25.
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domestic fowls must so restrain them as to-prevent their trespassing
upon the land of ,another or must such landowner protect his land
against such trespass or suffer the incidental injury without redress".
The court answered the first part of this question in the negative,
but it does not say whether the landowner must "suffer the incidental
injury without redress". If he cannot recover from the owner the
damage sustained, what are the rights of the proprietor of land which
has been damaged by his neighbor's chickens?
While there were no cases concerning trespassing chickens In this
state before the principal case was decided, presumably they would
fall within the rule of the common law approved in Heald v. Grier "
that the landowner may still drive trespassing animals from his land
by the use of reasonable means, but is liable to the animal's owner for
any injury resulting to it from the use of unnecessary force. It is immaterial that an injury so inflicted was sustained after the animal left the
land from which it was driven. 52 There is no right In this state to kill or
injure a trespassing animal 53 except In extreme cases, as where a
vicious buffalo had broken thru the defendant's fence and was about
to injure defendant's cattle; 5' but the decision would have been otherwise if the property endangered haa been of trivial value, or the defendant had had other means of preserving his property. Certainly
55
trespassing animals cannot be killed merely for being on the land, and
it is very doubtful whether the killing of chickens would ever be held
justifiable. In Clark v. Keliher, 5 the defendant was held liable for
killing the plaintiff's chickens which habitually trespassed on the defendant's land and built nests thereon; and in two Illinois cases, 57 the
defendants were held liable for killing turkeys belonging to the plaintiffs, tho the turkeys were causing apparently trivial damage to the
crops of the defendants. The same is true of poisoning chickens. 51
Notice to the owner of the trespassing fowls of intent to poison them
unless they are restrained is no defense in a suit for killing or poisoning. 5
It has been held that the common law right to distrain damage
0
feasant does not exist in this state, its abrogation being attributed
51.
52.

(1857) 12 Mo. App. 556.
lotten v. Cole (1862) 33 Me. 138.

53. State v. Prater (1908) 130 Mo. App. 348; State

v. Sillbaugh (1913)
250 Me. 308. Tle inclosure act of 1808 allowed the owner of land to kill
certain animals trespassing thru a lawful fence for the third time. This provision continued in force until 1877.
54. Canefox v. Crenshaw (1857) 24 Mo. 199.
55. Fenton v. Stesl (1879) 80 Mo. App. 135 (dog).
56. (1871) 107 Mass. 406.
App. 314; Hamilton v. Sampson (1913)
57. Ries v. Stratton (1887) 23 Ill.
184 Ill.
App. 316.
58. Johmson v. Patterson (1840) 14 Conn. 1: and of poisoning geese.
Matthews v. Fiestel (1853) 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 90.
59. Johnson v. Patterson (1840) 14 Conn. 1; Clark v. Kelher (1871) 107
Mass. 406.
60. Storm v. White (1886) 23 Mo. App. 31: Meckler v. Schuster (1897)
68 Mo. App. 670: Harris v. Brunnnell (1898) 74 Mo. App. 433.

LAW SERIES,

MISSOURI

BULLETIN

to the statutory provisions allowing the impounding of animals which
trespass thru a lawful fence. 61 Again the question arises, did this abrogation extend only as to animals named in the statute? As all the
cases found on this point involve the trespasses of animals named in
the statute, it might be held that so far as trespass thru outside fences Is
concerned, the owner of land can Impound trespassing chickens. But if
the decision in the principal case is that the statute of inclosures abrogated the common law as to liability for the trespass of all animals, then
the common law right of distraint Is abrogated as to chickens, for
such right does not exist unless the trespass be actionable. 62
As the common law Is in force between the owners of adjoining
lands, the right of distraint damage feasant exists as at common law, 03
and hence, in the absence of a lawful fence according to statute or agreement, trespassing chickens can be impounded. And it would seem that
the establishment and maintenance of such a fence would not affect
the right of distraint unless the laws concerning division fences abrogate the common law as to all animals.
The adoption of the stock law has been held not to change the
rights of adjoining landowners to distrain trespassing animals," and
since it does not restore the common law, 6" and the law contains no
provisions as to restraint of chickens, the rights of the landowner damaged by the trespass of chickens thru an outside fence remain the same
as before its adoption.
L. C. L.
472.

61.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 6456.

See Crocker v. Mann (1834) 3 Mo.

62. Clark & Lindsell, Torts (6th ed.) p. 343.
63. Gilmore v. Harp (1901) 92 Mo. App. 77; Jones v. fabbrnan (1902)
94 Mo. App. 1.

64. Jones v. Habberman (1902) 94 Mo. App. 1.
65. Rinehart v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (1904)
451. 80 S. W. 910.
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